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CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

WILLIAM

W.

KELLER*

Contempt of court has been defined as any conduct that, in law,
constitutes an offense against the authority and dignity of the court.
The classification of contempts as civil and criminal is one which
has been adopted by many courts, and I will discuss this classification briefly The courts that see such a distinction recognize
that the line of demarcation is hazy and very indistinct. The
classification is not followed by all jurisdictions; for instance, some
courts take the position that all contempts are criminal. As a
matter of fact there is a considerable diversity among courts as to
several aspects of contempt, and all I will do as to these aspects
is to mention what I feel are some of the prevailing views in the
absence of statute.
A common practice in labelling a contempt as civil or criminal
is to look to the purpose of the proceeding adjudicating the contempt. When the primary purpose of the proceeding is to preserve
the court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders
the contempt is criminal. When the primary purpose is to provide
a remedy for an injured litigant and to coerce compliance with an
order, the contempt is civil. A cnrmnal contempt is directed
against the power and dignity of the court, and proceedings relative
to such a contempt are for the protection of the court. A civil
contempt is the failure to give to a litigant the benefits he is entitled to under a court order, and proceedings relative to such a
contempt are mainly for the protection of the injured litigant.
There can, of course, be acts which constitute both civil and
criminal contempt. If a witness refuses, without proper cause, to
testify, after being ordered to do so by the court, this constitutes
a criminal contempt, since the witness defies the authority of the
court, and a civil contempt, since the witness deprives a litigant
of testimony he is entitled to under court order
Of course, such a witness can be imprisoned for civil contempt,
to try and compel him to testify later on in the trial, in order to
try and secure his testimony for a litigant, and he can also be punished for criminal contempt, in order to maintain the authority of
0
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the court. If he were only imprisoned to force him to testify, and
he continued m his refusal during the remainder of the trial, this
might be considered of little help in maintaining the authority of the
court, so that punishment for criminal contempt would also be considered advisable. Even if, after being imprisoned, he decided to
testify, and did so, although this would purge him of the civil contempt, it would not purge him of the criminal contempt, the two
contempts being separate and distinct, and he would still be subject
to punishment for criminal contempt.
Generally the court institutes a criminal contempt proceeding,
and, except in summary proceedings, designates a public prosecutor
or party to prosecute the proceeding. Also, generally a party mstitutes civil contempt proceedings, although there is authority to the
effect that the court may do so. It would appear that ordinarily
the court should leave it to the proper party to institute civil contempt proceedings, since the court order is for the party's benefit;
ordinarily, if the court institutes a civil contempt proceeding, the
alleged contemnor might feel that the court was unduly aiding the
other side. However, it may be that special circumstances will
exist in a particular case which make it proper and advisable for
the court to do so. For instance, it would appear that in the
case of the witness who refuses to testify, and is ordered by the
court to do so, the court may, in its discretion, take it on himself
to try and compel the witness to testify by imprisonment; the court
may feel in such a situation that, having ordered the witness to
testify he should, in the interest of a fair trial, undertake to enforce his order.
In civil contempt proceedings, if imprisonment is imposed, it
must ordinarily be coercive rather than punitive. Imprisonment for
civil contempt usually is not for a definite term, but the contemnor
stands committed unless and until he performs the act required by
the court order. It is said that the contemnor carries the key to
his cell in his pocket. On the other hand, in criminal contempt
proceedings imprisonment, if imposed, is for a fixed term.
The amount of punishment, in a criminal contempt proceeding,
is within the discretion of the court, but must be reasonable, and
cannot be cruel or unusual.
In a civil contempt proceeding it is, of course, proper for the
court to jail a contemnor until such time as he performs a certain
act, even though this may result in an extended confinement, since,
for one reason, the contemnor has the key to the jail in his pocket.
However, the question arises whether such a commitment may, in
a particular case, become so oppressive as to warrant relief. Sup-
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pose that a contemnor is imprisoned for failure to obey an order
to turn over to his divorced wife a ring worth $500.00, and that,
although he admits he could comply with the order, he doesn't do
so since the ring is a family heirloom and he is unusually stubborn. Does his confinement become so oppressive after one year,
or five years or ten years as to entitle him to relief?
In civil contempt proceedings it is generally held that since the
purpose of the proceeding is remedial, the defendant's intent in
committing the contempt is not material. In some criminal contempt
cases it has been held that intent is a necessary element of the
offense. Thus in United States v Kroger Grocery and Baking Co.'
when the defendant, the owner and operator of a number of grocery
stores, and its officers and employees were enjoined from selling
goods at prices in excess of OPA prices, the defendant company
was held not guilty of contempt when enjoined sales were made by
employees whom the defendant instructed not to sell for prices in
excess of the OPA prices.
In accordance with this distinction, it has been held in civil
contempt proceedings that it is no defense that the alleged contemnor
acted in reliance on advice of counsel, and in some criminal contempt proceedings that this is a good defense.
It seems that the intent referred to in discussing contempt is
subjective rather than objective. It is a question as to whether the
acts, words and circumstances show the necessary intent. In the
case of State v Goff2 a party in a case made threatening remarks
to a witness who had testified; the remarks were made on the
courthouse steps after the arguments in the case but before the
witness had been excused. The court held that these actions were
sufficient to prove the requisite intent for holding the party in contempt, even though the party did not intend to defy the court, since
it is a subjective rather than an objective intent that is required.
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally governed by the
rules applicable to criminal cases, whereas civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature.
Thus it has been said that a criminal contempt proceeding is
veritably a criminal trial in which the rules relative to the presumption of innocence and relative to establishing guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt apply, and the rules of evidence governing criminal trials apply In civil contempt proceedings it is frequently
held that it is only necessary to prove the contempt by a preponderance of the evidence.
i.
2.

163 F.2d 168 (1947).
228 S.C. 17, 88 S..2d 788 (1955).
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It has been held in both state and federal courts that an
alleged civil contemnor is not entitled to a jury trial. This has
also been the rule m state courts in criminal contempt proceedings,
in the absence of a statute. The rule in federal courts in criminal
contempt cases now appears to be somewhat different. In the case
of Cheff v Schnackenberg, 3 although the Court affirmed a criminal
contempt conviction without a jury, where the sentence was for six
months, the Court stated that in the exercise of its supervisory
power over federal courts, it ruled that sentence exceeding six
months for criminal contempt cannot be imposed by federal courts
unless a jury trial has been received or waived. This raises the
question as to whether or not state courts will be subject to such
a limitation under the due process clause of the 14th amendment.
The due process clause of the 14th amendment to the United
States Constitution has been held to apply to state criminal contempt
cases, and to require that one charged with contempt be given a
public hearing and an opportunity to be represented by counsel,
except in cases of direct contempt.
In the case of In re Oliver,4 Oliver testified as a witness before
a state judge sitting as a one man grand jury in secret session.
Immediately after he testified the judge summarily found him
guilty of contempt on the basis that he had given false and evasive
answers, the judge relying in part on testimony another witness had
previously given when Oliver was not present. The conviction was
not m open court, Oliver was not represented by counsel, and he
had no opportunity to present a defense.
The Court, in reversing the conviction for lack of due process,
stated that:
Except for a narrowly limited category of contempts, due
process of law as explained in the Cooke case requires that
one charged with contempt of court be advised of
charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to
meet them by way of defense of explanation, have the right
to be represented by counsel, and have the right to testify
and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation. The narrow exception to the due
process requirements includes only charges of misconduct,
in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturb
the court business, when all of the essential elements of the
misconduct are under the eyes of the court, are actually
observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is
essential to prevent "demoralization of the court's authority
3.
4.

384 U.S. 373 (1966).
833 U.S. 257 (1948).
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before the public." If some of the essential elements of the
offense are not personally observed by the judge, so that
he must depend on statements made by others for his knowledge about these essential elements, due process requires,
according to the Cooke case, that the accused be accorded
notice and a fair hearing.
The Oliver case involved a criminal contempt. However, it is
generally held in civil as well as in criminal contempt cases that
the person charged with contempt has a right, except in cases of
direct contempt, to a hearing and to representation by counsel.
The question arises as to this last mentioned right as to whether
one charged with a serious indirect criminal contempt is entitled
to have the state furnish a lawyer for him, at the state expense,
if he is financially unable to do so.
The Court also held in the Oliver case that the conviction must
be set aside because it was done in secret session.
This same issue was considered in Levine v United States.5
In that case, the petitioner, having refused to answer questions before a grand jury in a federal district court, was brought, together
with the grand jury, before the judge. The court cleared the courtroom of all but the petitioner, his counsel, the grand jury, the
government counsel and the reporter The court again asked the
questions of the petitioner, and, on his refusal to answer, found him
in contempt. In this case, the conviction was sustained. The Court
stated that the petitioner did not have a right to a public hearing
up through the time when the questions were asked him, because
of the secret nature of grand jury proceedings, but did have a right
to a. public hearing after that time, when he refused to answer and
when he was convicted of contempt. However, the Court distinguished this case from the Oliver case on the basis that the petitioner's
counsel did not ask to have the hearing opened to the public. The
use of summary procedure in a situation such as existed in this
case was later disapproved in Harris v United States,6 which
overruled Brown v United States.'
Although the Oliver case relates to a criminal contempt proceeding, it would seem that the general rule giving the right to
public hearings would apply to civil contempt proceedings.
These cases raise the question as to whether it is ordinarily
advisable for a court to hold a contempt hearing in chambers.
5.
6.
7.

362 U.S. 610 (1960).
359 U.S. 19 (1959).
359 U.S. 41 (1959).
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There are two fairly recent United States Supreme Court cases
which deal with the right to a hearing in criminal contempt cases.
In Harris v United States," which I have already mentioned,
as disapproving summary procedure in a situation such as existed
in the Levine case, the petitioner refused to answer questions before
a New York grand jury The petitioner and the grand jury were
brought before the District Court where he again refused to answer,
whereupon he was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to one
year imprisonment. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction
since the petitioner was not given a, hearing, the Court holding that
this was not a case of direct contempt.
In Holt v Commonwealth of Virginia9 the Court held that the
conviction of an attorney for contempt was not consistent with due
process. In this case the judge had cited Attorney A for contempt.
Attorney B, in representing Attorney A, filed a motion to change
the venue, alleging that the judge, in the contempt proceedings
against A, had acted as police officer, prosecution witness, adverse
witness and grand jury The court thereupon held Attorney B guilty
of contempt on the basis of the allegation in the motion to change
the venue. The court acted summarily, without a hearing, and the
Supreme Court held that this was not due process. The Court stated
that the judge, in order to hold Attorney B guilty of contempt, must
have assumed that the allegations in the motion were untrue, which
he had no right to do.

8.
9.

Supra note 6.
381 U.S. 131 (1965).

